NAME
ipsec
—
Internet Protocol Security
protocol
SYNOPSIS
options IPSEC
options IPSEC_SUPPORT
device crypto
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#include
<netipsec/ipsec6.h>
DESCRIPTION
ipsec
is a security protocol implemented within the
Internet Protocol layer of the networking stack. ipsec
is defined for both IPv4 and IPv6
(inet(4) and
inet6(4)). ipsec
is a set of protocols, ESP
(for Encapsulating Security Payload) AH (for Authentication Header), and
IPComp (for IP Payload Compression Protocol) that provide security services
for IP datagrams. AH both authenticates and guarantees the integrity of an IP
packet by attaching a cryptographic checksum computed using one-way hash
functions. ESP, in addition, prevents unauthorized parties from reading the
payload of an IP packet by also encrypting it. IPComp tries to increase
communication performance by compressing IP payload, thus reducing the amount
of data sent. This will help nodes on slow links but with enough computing
power. ipsec
operates in one of two modes: transport
mode or tunnel mode. Transport mode is used to protect peer-to-peer
communication between end nodes. Tunnel mode encapsulates IP packets within
other IP packets and is designed for security gateways such as VPN endpoints.
System configuration requires the crypto(4) subsystem.
The packets can be passed to a virtual enc(4) interface, to perform packet filtering before outbound encryption and after decapsulation inbound.
To properly filter on the inner packets of an
ipsec
tunnel with firewalls, you can change the
values of the following sysctls
Name | Default | Enable |
net.inet.ipsec.filtertunnel | 0 | 1 |
net.inet6.ipsec6.filtertunnel | 0 | 1 |
Kernel interface
ipsec
is controlled by a key management
and policy engine, that reside in the operating system kernel. Key
management is the process of associating keys with security associations,
also know as SAs. Policy management dictates when new security associations
created or destroyed.
The key management engine can be accessed from userland by using
PF_KEY
sockets. The PF_KEY
socket API is defined in RFC2367.
The policy engine is controlled by an extension to the
PF_KEY
API,
setsockopt(2) operations, and
sysctl(3) interface. The kernel implements an extended version of the
PF_KEY
interface and allows the programmer to define
IPsec policies which are similar to the per-packet filters. The
setsockopt(2) interface is used to define per-socket
behavior, and
sysctl(3) interface is used to define host-wide default behavior.
The kernel code does not implement a dynamic encryption key
exchange protocol such as IKE (Internet Key Exchange). Key exchange
protocols are beyond what is necessary in the kernel and should be
implemented as daemon processes which call the
APIs.
Policy management
IPsec policies can be managed in one of two ways, either by
configuring per-socket policies using the
setsockopt(2) system calls, or by configuring kernel level
packet filter-based policies using the PF_KEY
interface, via the
setkey(8) you can define IPsec policies against packets using rules
similar to packet filtering rules. Refer to
setkey(8) on how to use it.
Depending on the socket's address family, IPPROTO_IP or IPPROTO_IPV6 transport level and IP_IPSEC_POLICY or IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options may be used to configure per-socket security policies. A properly-formed IPsec policy specification structure can be created using ipsec_set_policy(3) function and used as socket option value for the setsockopt(2) call.
When setting policies using the
setkey(8) command, the
“default
” option instructs the system
to use its default policy, as explained below, for processing packets. The
following sysctl variables are available for configuring the system's IPsec
behavior. The variables can have one of two values. A
1
means “use
”,
which means that if there is a security association then use it but if there
is not then the packets are not processed by IPsec. The value
2
is synonymous with
“require
”, which requires that a
security association must exist for the packets to move, and not be dropped.
These terms are defined in
ipsec_set_policy(8).
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.esp_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.esp_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_net_deflev | integer | yes |
If the kernel does not find a matching, system wide, policy then
the default value is applied. The system wide default policy is specified by
the following
sysctl(8) variables. 0
means
“discard
” which asks the kernel to
drop the packet. 1
means
“none
”.
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.def_policy | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.def_policy | integer | yes |
Miscellaneous sysctl variables
When the ipsec
protocols are configured
for use, all protocols are included in the system. To selectively
enable/disable protocols, use
sysctl(8).
Name | Default |
net.inet.esp.esp_enable | On |
net.inet.ah.ah_enable | On |
net.inet.ipcomp.ipcomp_enable | On |
In addition the following variables are accessible via sysctl(8), for tweaking the kernel's IPsec behavior:
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_cleartos | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_offsetmask | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.dfbit | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ecn | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.debug | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.natt_cksum_policy | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.check_policy_history | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ecn | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.debug | integer | yes |
The variables are interpreted as follows:
ipsec.ah_cleartos
- If set to non-zero, the kernel clears the type-of-service field in the IPv4 header during AH authentication data computation. This variable is used to get current systems to inter-operate with devices that implement RFC1826 AH. It should be set to non-zero (clear the type-of-service field) for RFC2402 conformance.
ipsec.ah_offsetmask
- During AH authentication data computation, the kernel will include a 16bit fragment offset field (including flag bits) in the IPv4 header, after computing logical AND with the variable. The variable is used for inter-operating with devices that implement RFC1826 AH. It should be set to zero (clear the fragment offset field during computation) for RFC2402 conformance.
ipsec.dfbit
- This variable configures the kernel behavior on IPv4 IPsec tunnel encapsulation. If set to 0, the DF bit on the outer IPv4 header will be cleared while 1 means that the outer DF bit is set regardless from the inner DF bit and 2 indicates that the DF bit is copied from the inner header to the outer one. The variable is supplied to conform to RFC2401 chapter 6.1.
ipsec.ecn
- If set to non-zero, IPv4 IPsec tunnel encapsulation/decapsulation behavior
will be friendly to ECN (explicit congestion notification), as documented
in
draft-ietf-ipsec-ecn-02.txt
. gif(4) talks more about the behavior. ipsec.debug
- If set to non-zero, debug messages will be generated via syslog(3).
ipsec.natt_cksum_policy
- Controls how the kernel handles TCP and UDP checksums when ESP in UDP encapsulation is used for IPsec transport mode. If set to a non-zero value, the kernel fully recomputes checksums for inbound TCP segments and UDP datagrams after they are decapsulated and decrypted. If set to 0 and original addresses were configured for corresponding SA by the IKE daemon, the kernel incrementally recomputes checksums for inbound TCP segments and UDP datagrams. If addresses were not configured, the checksums are ignored.
ipsec.check_policy_history
- Enables strict policy checking for inbound packets. By default, inbound security policies check that packets handled by IPsec have been decrypted and authenticated. If this variable is set to a non-zero value, each packet handled by IPsec is checked against the history of IPsec security associations. The IPsec security protocol, mode, and SA addresses must match.
Variables under the net.inet6.ipsec6
tree
have similar meanings to those described above.
PROTOCOLS
The ipsec
protocol acts as a plug-in to
the inet(4) and
inet6(4) protocols and therefore supports most of the protocols
defined upon those IP-layer protocols. The
icmp(4) and
icmp6(4) protocols may behave differently with
ipsec
because ipsec
can
prevent icmp(4) or
icmp6(4) routines from looking into the IP payload.
SEE ALSO
ioctl(2), socket(2), ipsec_set_policy(3), crypto(4), enc(4), if_ipsec(4), icmp6(4), intro(4), ip6(4), setkey(8), sysctl(8)
S. Kent and R. Atkinson, IP Authentication Header, RFC 2404.
S. Kent and R. Atkinson, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 2406.
STANDARDS
Daniel L. McDonald, Craig Metz, and Bao G. Phan, PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2, RFC, 2367.
D. L. McDonald, A Simple IP Security API Extension to BSD Sockets, internet draft, draft-mcdonald-simple-ipsec-api-03.txt, work in progress material.
HISTORY
The original ipsec
implementation appeared
in the WIDE/KAME IPv6/IPsec stack.
For FreeBSD 5.0 a fully locked IPsec implementation called fast_ipsec was brought in. The protocols drew heavily on the OpenBSD implementation of the IPsec protocols. The policy management code was derived from the KAME implementation found in their IPsec protocols. The fast_ipsec implementation lacked ip6(4) support but made use of the crypto(4) subsystem.
For FreeBSD 7.0
ip6(4) support was added to fast_ipsec. After this the old KAME IPsec
implementation was dropped and fast_ipsec became what now is the only
ipsec
implementation in
FreeBSD.
BUGS
There is no single standard for the policy engine API, so the policy engine API described herein is just for this implementation.
AH and tunnel mode encapsulation may not work as you might expect.
If you configure inbound “require” policy with an AH tunnel or
any IPsec encapsulating policy with AH (like
“esp/tunnel/A-B/use
ah/transport/A-B/require
”), tunnelled packets will be
rejected. This is because the policy check is enforced on the inner packet
on reception, and AH authenticates encapsulating (outer) packet, not the
encapsulated (inner) packet (so for the receiving kernel there is no sign of
authenticity). The issue will be solved when we revamp our policy engine to
keep all the packet decapsulation history.
When a large database of security associations or policies is
present in the kernel the SADB_DUMP
and
SADB_SPDDUMP
operations on
PF_KEY
sockets may fail due to lack of space.
Increasing the socket buffer size may alleviate this problem.
The IPcomp protocol may occasionally error because of zlib(3) problems.
This documentation needs more review.